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Riley’s Less Obvious Tradeoff:
Forgoing Scope-Limited Searches

Richard H. McAdams *
To some fanfare, Riley v. California 1 announced the fourth amendment 2
requirements for searching a cell phone found on a person incident to that
person’s lawful arrest. The Supreme Court held that such a search requires a
warrant. To reach this conclusion, the Court made two decisions. The first was
whether to deviate from the rule established in United States v. Robinson, 3 which
categorically allows the warrantless search, incident to arrest, of the personal
property “immediately associated with” the arrestee. 4 Robinson specifically
allows the thorough search of a container, and the first question in Riley was
whether that rule applied when the container was a cell phone.
I shall have only a little to say about this aspect of Riley. Robinson had not
been uncontroversial, but, for a long time, when applied to containers found in
the possession of a person being arrested, the loss of privacy from a search was
usually limited, given what people tended to carry on their person, so there was
something to be said for relieving the police of the burden of getting a warrant,
given a valid arrest. Occasionally, people might possess something particularly
sensitive on their person, a diary or medical file, but no rule gets the tradeoff
right in every case. Nonetheless, long after Robinson, people started to carry cell
Bernard D. Meltzer Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I thank
Arnold Loewy for hosting this conference and including me. For very helpful comments
on my presentation and earlier drafts, I thank Orin Kerr, Andy Leipold, John Rappaport,
Chris Slobogin, and Lior Strahilevitz. For excellent research assistance, I thank Kayla
Gamin and Ben Montague.
1 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014). The case combined Riley v. California and United States v.
Wurie.
2
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
3 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
4 The quoted words come from the later case, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 15 (1977), where the Court distinguished Robinson and required a warrant to search a
footlocker when it was not “immediately associated with” the person of the arrestee.
*
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phones. The pervasive use of cell phones changes the tradeoff, as it means that a
high percentage of Americans now routinely possess a digital device that
contains a huge volume of personal data about their lives – messages, locations,
photographs, internet search history, personalized apps, etc. It is simply too
much to give the police warrantless access to 100% of that information based
merely on probable cause to believe a person has committed a crime, even the
most trivial crime and even crimes for which there is no reason to expect the
phone to contain evidence of the crime.
So it was not entirely surprising that the Court decided unanimously that
Robinson does not apply to cell phone searches incident to arrest. The Court gave
various good legal and policy reasons for its decision. I might add one reason the
Court predictably did not mention, given its hostility to claims of pretext 5: if
police expected to acquire a treasure trove of personal and historical information
by arresting an individual, because the arrest automatically made the entire cell
phone subject to search, they would have a powerful incentive to make arrests
for trivial crimes, of the sort they would not ordinarily make, for no other
purpose than to gain that evidence. 6
Yet my concern and the sole focus of this essay is the second decision in
Riley, less obvious but no less necessary to resolve the case. If Robinson is not
controlling, must the result be that a warrant (or other warrant exception) is
required for any cell phone search incident to arrest? The United States argued
for various “fallback options,” 7 in the event that Robinson were not controlling.
These options compromised between the Robinson rule that requires no
additional justification for the search (given a valid arrest) and the general
container rule that requires a warrant (or other warrant exception). 8 If the chief
concern in distinguishing Robinson is to avoid the absurd result that a valid arrest
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080-83 (2011) (holding that an
objectively justified arrest does not violate the fourth amendment just because it was a
pretext for detaining the citizen); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996)
(holding that whether a traffic stop is consistent with the fourth amendment does not
depend on the officer’s subjective motivations).
6 The problem is acute because, in past decisions, the Court has ruled that the
fourth amendment permits arrests for misdemeanors committed in the officer’s presence,
no matter how trivial the offense, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), and
even if the state law does not authorize the arrest for that offense. See Virginia v. Moore,
553 U.S. 164 (2008).
7 Riley, at 2491.
8 See Chadwick, supra note 3.
5

2
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gives the police everything on the phone without any judicial oversight, no matter
the nature of the offense, then one might avoid that result while still giving the
police a power in some cases to search some part of the phone. So the governments
(the United States and California) argued in the alternative for various
intermediate rules, which would permit but limit warrantless cell phone search
incident to arrest. A crucial part of Chief Justice Robert’s opinion in Riley is the
section rejecting all of these alternatives. 9 In this essay, I examine the arguments
for the compromise of a scope-limited search of cell phone incident to arrest, as I
will define.
I proceed in three parts. I begin by stepping back from the particular
context of cell phones and searches incident to arrest. The decision whether to
recognize a scope-limited search incident to arrest is part of a fundamental choice
for fourth amendment law, which is whether to recognize distinctions in the
intensity of searches. As I explain in Part I, the Court recognizes a distinct
category of low-intensity, scope-limited searches in several contexts, but rejects it
in others. Riley is the latest example of the latter. Given the case’s high profile
significance for the intersection of new technology with the fourth amendment, it
may be easy to overlook this other way that Riley matters to the fundamentals of
doctrine.
In Part II, I define the particular scope-limited search of a cell phone
searches incident to arrest that I will defend: the Court could have permitted
police to conduct a brief field search of a cell phone incident to arrest, without a
warrant, where there is reason to believe that the phone contains useful evidence
of the crime of arrest and where the police limit their search to the places where
such evidence might realistically be found. In this Part, I consider the Court’s
brief argument for rejecting any such compromise solution.
In Part III, I make the case for the warrantless scope-limited search. I do
so while assuming, as the Court did, the basic framework of relevant fourth
amendment doctrine. 10 First, even if one prefers simple rules for searches
incident to arrest, and therefore prefers a single category of “search,” this context
is one where the stakes, for privacy and law enforcement, are high enough to
Riley, at 2491–93.
Thus, I assume a warrant requirement subject to numerous exceptions. I do not
consider general arguments against the warrant requirement, nor a general attack on the
search-incident doctrine (that might, contrary to Robinson, demand a warrant to search
any container found on an arrestee once it is secured).
9

10
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justify a more complex rule, such as one that distinguishes between scopelimited and full-fledged searches.
Second, a scope-limited search would plausibly set the right balance
between law enforcement needs and the values of the fourth amendment.
Limited cell phone searches, incident to arrest, may be an important component
of good investigative police work, where persistent promptness in following up
leads is valuable, even though the value of timeliness falls short of that
demanded by the exigent circumstances exception. Indeed, just a few months
after Riley, the Canadian Supreme Court authorized a kind of scope-limited
search of a cell phone incident to arrest based on just these concerns. 11 By
contrast, the warrant requirement might actually produce cell phone searches
that are far more intrusive and destructive of privacy than what a cursory field
search would allow.
Third, Riley creates a doctrinal anomaly: the enormous gap between
searching private digital and private analog data incident to arrest. As I explain,
the gap would be less incongruous if the Court allowed a warrantless, scopelimited search of the cell phone. Indeed, the category of scope-limited searches
might facilitate greater fourth amendment protection of ordinary analog
“papers,” incident to arrest, than currently exists.
Finally, the refusal to recognize a scope-limited search will put pressure
on lower courts to expand the exigent circumstances exception, to recognize an
alternative path to quick and minor searches of phones. If so, the broadening of
exigent circumstances will have undesirable effects beyond the search of cell
phones incident to arrest, making it easier to justify the warrantless search of
homes.
In sum, although I fully agree with the Court’s decision to distinguish
Robinson, I argue that the Court erred in its unanimous decision to reject all the
governments’ compromise solutions. The Court should not have required a
warrant or (other) warrant exception for any and all searches of a cell phone
incident to arrest.
I. HOW MANY KINDS OF SEARCHES ARE THERE?
To show how Riley fits into the broader framework of the fourth
amendment, I begin by identifying the subcategories of a search. By subcategories,
11

Regina v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77 (2014).
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I distinguish the broader category of a search, which, for understandable reasons,
occupies the considerable attention of courts and scholars. 12 The line between a
search and a non-search (like the line between a seizure and a non-seizure)
defines the threshold issue for application of the fourth amendment. But once the
government activity is classified as a search, there remain important doctrinal
distinctions within the category, defining differences among searches. The
relevant doctrine sometimes refuses to recognize any difference among searches,
concluding that “a search is a search.” 13 In other cases, however, the doctrine
distinguishes between search types, each with a different requirement for
making the search reasonable. (There are also parallel distinctions among types
of seizures, but they are less pertinent to Riley 14).
When the police seek evidence of criminal wrongdoing, how many types
of search are there? 15 The answer in fourth amendment doctrine depends on
For recent commentary, see Sherry F. Colb, “What is a Search? Two Conceptual
Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy,” 55 Stan. L. Rev. 119
(2002); Thomas K. Clancy, “What is a ‘Search’ Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?,” 70 Alb. L. Rev. 1 (2006); Orin S. Kerr, “The Curious History of Fourth
Amendment Searches,” 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 67 (2012).
13 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
14 Regarding seizures of persons, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), famously
recognizes the lesser seizure of an investigative stop, justified by reasonable suspicion, as
distinguished from the greater seizure of an arrest, justified only by probable cause. Of
practical significance, the concept of the low intensity seizure applies to ordinary
automobile stops. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) (stating that
“a routine traffic stop,” which is ordinarily relatively brief, “is ‘more analogous to a socalled “Terry stop” . . . than to a formal arrest,’” quoting Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113,
117 (1998), in turn quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). The fourth
amendment also recognizes a separate category of high intensity seizures of persons,
those involving the use of deadly force, which require heightened justification. See
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that use of deadly force to seize a fleeing
felon violates the fourth amendment unless the felon has committed a violent crime or
other poses an ongoing danger).
The Supreme Court has extended this distinction in the intensity of seizures to
property, where the duration of detention determines whether probable cause or
reasonable suspicion is required. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 705-06 (1983)
(“Given . . . that seizures of property can vary in intrusiveness, some brief detentions of
personal effects may be so minimally intrusive of Fourth Amendment interests that
strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a seizure based only on specific
articulable facts that the property contains contraband or evidence of a crime.”).
15 My focus on ordinary criminal wrongdoing excludes consideration of the
“special needs” doctrine, where the Court steps outside the probable cause/warrant
framework that governs Riley in favor of a general balancing. Regarding the special
12
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what is being searched. The fourth amendment lists four objects of a search:
persons, houses, papers, and effects. Begin with the search of persons, the context
in which it is most well-established, since Terry v. Ohio, 16 that there is more than
one category. Terry created the new category of a “frisk,” the patting down of the
outer clothing in a search for weapons. 17 The doctrinal significance is that a full
search requires the probable cause (to believe the suspect has committed a
crime 18), whereas, after a lawful stop, the frisk requires only reasonable or
articulable suspicion that the suspect is armed. 19 For our purposes, what matters
is that there is more than one type of search (of a person).
In fact, there are more than two. Some cases involve extraordinary
searches. For example, Lee v. Winston held that ordinary standards, such as
probable cause and a warrant, are not sufficient to justify a search that involved
surgery (requiring general anesthesia) to recover a bullet in the suspect’s
shoulder, probably the same bullet the victim had justifiably fired at the criminal
perpetrator. 20 The Court upheld an injunction against the surgery, partly because
other substantial evidence meant that the bullet was not vital evidence for
securing a conviction, a factor not ordinarily relevant to fourth amendment
needs doctrine, see, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, “Protecting the Citizen ‘Whilst He Is Quiet’:
Suspicionless Searches, ‘Special Needs’ and General Warrants,” 74 Miss. L.J. 501, 546-47
(2005); Fabio Arcila, Jr., “Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil
Searches in the Modern Regulatory State,” 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1223 (2004). For the
relationship between the doctrine and administrative search doctrine, see Eva Brensike
Primus, “Disentangling Administrative Searches,” 111 Colum. L. Rev. 254 (2001). For
special needs, one might say there are no finite number of searches because the court
balances the law enforcement benefits against the privacy (or other) costs of the specific
search at issue. Riley deals with police searches to advance “the general interest in crime
control,” City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000), so I generally ignore
special needs in what follows (except in note xx [39]).
16 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17 Id at 8.
18 More precisely, the police officer needs probable cause to believe the suspect
has committed a felony or probable cause the suspect has committed a misdemeanor in
the officer’s presence. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976)(discussing the
common-law rule that an “officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a
misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed
in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest”); Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001)(“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may . . .
arrest the offender.”).
19 See Terry, supra.
20 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
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analysis. 21 Again, for my purposes, what matters is that there are (at least) three
kinds of searches of persons in fourth amendment law: a low intensity frisk, a
medium intensity ordinary search, and a high intensity surgical intrusion. 22
When we move from “persons” to “houses, papers, and effects,”
however, it becomes more difficult to answer the question: how many types of
search are there? Start with “houses” or real property and, here, start with entry.
Entry into a home, or even the curtilage around a home, requires probable cause
and a warrant or warrant exception. 23 Yet one could plausibly say that the
doctrine recognizes two degrees of entry. Ordinary home searches require that
police “knock and announce” their presence and pause for a brief time before
entering. Yet police can avoid this requirement (by a “no knock” warrant or
exigency) if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the warning would prompt
the occupants to destroy evidence or prepare to attack police. 24 An unwarned
entry is more intense and more threatening to privacy and security, so the

Id. at 765–66.
Another high intensity search of a person is a strip search or body cavity
search. The Supreme Court recently upheld strip searches of those entering the general
jail population in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington,
566 U.S. __ (2012). But there is still a general understanding that such searches must be
analyzed separately from an ordinary search of a person. See, e.g., United States v.
Husband, 226 F.3d 626, 634 (7th Cir. 2000)(“A compelled medical procedure, coupled
with an invasive search of a person’s body cavity, is a significant intrusion upon an
individual’s dignity and privacy interests, and whenever possible, should be preceded by
a neutral evaluation of the manner in which the search is to be executed.”).
23 See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387
U.S. 523 (1967)(overruling prior decision upholding warrantless administrative searches
of homes); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)(holding that a non-trespassory use of
thermal imager measuring only the heat emanating from a house was a house search
requiring warrant). See also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (explaining fourfactor test for defining curtilage, the search of which requires a warrant).
24 See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995)(holding that the knock-andannounce principle is part the reasonableness requirement); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520
U.S. 385, 394 (1997)(holding that the knock and announce obligation does not apply when
officers “have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence,
under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or ... would inhibit the
effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of
evidence”); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003)(holding that an interval of 15-20
seconds after announcing and before entry was reasonable given the exigency of possible
destruction of evidence). Of course, all of this matters less because the exclusionary rule
does not apply to knock-and-announce violations. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586
(2006).
21
22
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doctrine requires greater justification. Thus, we might say that the search
constituting a home entry has two levels, warned and unwarned.
After entry is effected, there is more than one kind of search inside the
home. An ordinary interior search requires probable cause and a warrant or
warrant exception. 25 But there are lesser searches in the home, such as the
“protective sweep,” 26 a quick search for people in the home (other than those
named in the warrant) who might be a threat to the officers. The issue arises
because the ordinary search has to end when the object of the search, including a
person to be arrested, is found; the ordinary search is also limited to places
where the items named in the warrant might be found. 27
In Maryland v. Buie, however, the Court authorized searching beyond
these temporal and spatial limits, empowering police in every case to examine
immediately adjoining areas for hidden persons without any reason to believe
these adjoining areas actually contain such persons, much less that they pose a
danger. 28 Second, Buie empowered officers to look anywhere beyond the
immediately adjoining areas they have reasonable suspicion to believe that a
dangerous person is present and may pose a risk of attack. The Court analogized
to Terry and a subsequent case authorizing the “frisk” of a car (discussed in the
next paragraph). 29 Like Terry, the protective sweep authorized is more limited in
scope than an ordinary home search – applying to a narrower band of the home
and for a limited purpose that will exclude searching drawers, cabinets, and
other compartments too small for a person. 30 And it is triggered by something
less than probable cause (for adjoining spaces, by the mere validity of the entry,

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)(rejecting “murder scene exception”
to warrant requirement for home search).
26 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
27 For example, if one were looking for a recently stolen car or other particularly
large items, then the search warrant would not authorize looking through closets or
shower stalls or on upper floors where they could not plausibly be located.
28 Buie, at 334.
29 Id. at 332.
30 One might object that protective sweeps are not a different category of search,
but merely a standard search for something the size of a person. Yet there is something
distinctive about Buie searches. First, the normal principles would not allow the search;
otherwise there would be no need for a special rule. Second, the search authorized is
intended to be scope-limited, a quick look in separate rooms for a person. That is why the
court explicitly refers to the idea of a frisk, citing Terry. The Court uses Terry because it
means to authorize only a low-intensity search
25
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and for further searches, by reasonable suspicion). So there are at least two
categories of search of real property (“houses”). 31
With respect to personal property (“papers and effects”), we see a similar
rule in one and only one instance: the automobile. An ordinary search of an
automobile is excused from the warrant requirement, but requires probable
cause. 32 Yet in Michigan v. Long, the Court recognized the possibility that a valid
Terry-stop could permit a cursory search for weapons of the car of the person
stopped. 33 In the case, police had approached an individual outside his car,
which was parked on the side of the road. The car door was open; upon seeing
the police, the suspect walked back to the open door; and from the outside,
police spotted a hunting knife in the car. The Court therefore upheld a cursory
sweep for weapons in the passenger area of the car based on reasonable
suspicion, not probable cause. 34 The Court saw the case as entirely about the
scope of Terry to frisk the area around the suspect in addition to the suspect. 35 An
ordinary car search allows the police to look anywhere in the car where they may
find the evidence they have probable cause to believe is present in the car. 36 In

Exactly how many more than one is a difficult issue. One might count Buie
itself as creating two non-ordinary search subcategories, for the home, one for persons in
spaces adjoining the location where police find the object of the search such as an arrestee
(which requires no additional justification) and another for non-adjoining spaces
(requiring reasonable suspicion to believe a dangerous person is present), so the total
number of search types is arguably three. Further complicating the count is Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), under which, if the arrest in the home is valid, the
police can, without further justification, search for evidence of a crime or weapons not
only on the arrestee's person, but also in “the area [in the home] 'within his immediate
control' – construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."
No Supreme Court case identifies a high intensity search of real property,
analogous to surgery on a person, in which a warrant is insufficient. But one might
imagine that the courts would create such a category if the police wanted to do
something highly destructive, such as to dig up the foundations of a house looking for a
buried body. See, e.g., United States v. Martineau, No. 03-10298 at *17 (D.Mass. Feb. 23,
2005) (finding that the removal of part of a wall was unreasonable, given the absence of
suspicion that the wall contained evidence of crime). But see United States v. Becker, 929
F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the use of a jackhammer to search for evidence
beneath a concrete slab on the land behind defendant’s home was reasonable).
32 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
33 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
34 Id. at 1035–36.
35 Id. at 1043.
36 Acevedo, at 568.
31
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Long, the police acted on reasonable suspicion and “restricted” their search “to
those areas to which Long would generally have immediate control, and that
could contain a weapon.” 37 Thus, the Terry search is more limited in scope and
duration than a car search justified by probable cause. As the Court later put it:
“In a sense, Long authorized a ‘frisk’ of an automobile for weapons.” 38 Thus,
there are at least two categories of search of an automobile.
Beyond these cases – persons, real property, and automobiles – the
Supreme Court has never recognized a distinctive category of low intensity or
scope-limited search (although some lower courts have 39). To the contrary, the
Court emphatically rejected such a category in Arizona v. Hicks. 40 There, the
police entered an apartment based on exigent circumstances, the recent firing of
a weapon. The circumstances justified the police in looking for a shooter or a
weapon. The Court held that police exceeded that authority by picking up a
stereo they suspected was stolen and turning it around to read serial numbers
otherwise blocked from view. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia stated that “[a]
search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a
turntable.” 41 He held that this additional search required additional justification
in the form of probable cause to believe the stereo was stolen. 42

Long, at 1050.
Buie, at 332.
39 In the Terry-search context, some courts uphold what is described as a “frisk”
of a backpack or purse, as part of a frisk of a person for guns supported only by
reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Mendez, 626 F.3d 203, 213
(4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Medina, 130 Fed.Appx. 862 (9th Cir. 2005). These cases do
not actually hold that a greater search would violate the fourth amendment, and other
cases have rejected that idea. See US v. Walker, 615 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2010), and cases
cited therein. Nonetheless, Hernandez-Mendez and Medina, recognize a conceptual
distinction in high and low-intensity searches of personal effects. Another example is the
special needs context (which I am generally ignoring for reasons explained in n. xx). In
MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2nd Cir. 2006), the court upheld a program of the
inspection of bags for individuals entering the New York City subway. Besides relying
on the fact that the process was random and focused only on bags large enough to
contain explosives, the court also emphasized the cursory nature of the inspection: only a
quick look, lasting a few seconds, inside compartments big enough to hold explosives. Id.
at 264–65.
37
38

Hicks, 480 U.S. at 1154.
Id. at 1153.
42 Id. at 1153–54.
40
41
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In contrast, the Hicks dissent saw the case as the perfect vehicle to
recognize a scope-limited search doctrine for personal property other than cars.
Justice O’Connor, writing for herself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Powell,
distinguished “a full-blown search” from “a cursory inspection of an item in
plain view,” 43 where the former required probable cause and the later, only
reasonable, articulable suspicion. Characterizing the precedent of the time, she
said that “the overwhelming majority of both state and federal courts have held
that probable cause is not required for a minimal inspection of an item in plain
view.” 44 She found this to be entirely consistent with the general tenets of fourth
amendment doctrine: “We have long recognized that searches can vary in
intrusiveness, and that some brief searches ‘may be so minimally intrusive . . .
that strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a [search] based
only on specific articulable facts’ that the item in question is contraband or
evidence of a crime.” 45 She concluded that “the theoretical advantages of the
‘search is a search’ approach . . . are simply too remote to justify the tangible and
severe damage it inflicts on legitimate and effective law enforcement.” 46
Figure 1 summarizes this tentative taxonomy, showing the how fourth
amendment doctrine does and does not distinguish between searches, depending
on the target of the search. Now we can see how Riley fits into the overall picture.
Riley offered another opportunity to recognize a category of low intensity
searches of personal property. The Court could have held that, incident to arrest
of a person with a cell phone, the police may conduct a cursory, “minimal
inspection” of the phone, but that a warrant would be needed to proceed beyond
the limited scope. Without either side referring to Hicks, the governments were
arguing (as a fallback) for the position of the Hicks dissent and the Court
unanimously favored the position of the Hicks majority. 47

Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1158.
45 Id at 1159. Justice Powell, writing for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice Powell, made similar points, distinguishing the movement of the stereo from a
“general exploratory search.” Id. at 1156.
43
44

Id. at 1160
The comparison does not mean that Hicks could not be distinguished from
Riley, as discussed infra TAN at p. xx.
46
47
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Search

None?

None (Hicks)
Protective Sweep (Long)
None (Riley)
FIGURE 1 48

Search
Search
Search

None
None?
None

PERSONAL PROPERTY
Generally
But Automobiles
But Cell phones?

As a small digression from the focus on Riley, consider that Figure 1
might have even more cases in it if I included, not only cases that are explicitly
about the number of search subcategories, but also cases that might be
reinterpreted to include this concern. I offer one example, drawing on another
case heavily discussed at the conference: United States v. Jones. 49 There, Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan joined Justice Alito’s concurring opinion, which
said that the monitoring of an individual’s public movements, using a GPS
device placed on his automobile, would constitute a search only if the duration
One might complicate the figure in various ways to reflect, for example, the
fact that knock-and-announce rules create two levels of home entry, as discussed TAN
xx, or the point made in note xx that Buie arguably creates two non-ordinary
subcategories of the search within a home.
One might also chart the subcategories of seizure, of persons and property, as
discussed above in note [14], as follows:
48

SEIZURE
TARGET:

LOW

ORDINARY

PERSONS

Stop (Terry)

Arrest

PROPERTY

Temporary
Detention (Place)

Full Seizure
(Place)

49

United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
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HIGH

Deadly Force
(Garner)
None?

were sufficiently long. 50 This reasoning was supposed to distinguish the 1983
decision in United States v. Knotts, 51 where the court held that several hours of
locational monitoring (using a transponder or “beeper”) did not constitute a
search. As new cell phone technology creates a compelling policy reason in Riley
to distinguish Robinson, new tracking technology creates a compelling policy
reason in Jones to distinguish Knotts. Under the Alito reasoning, the locational
monitoring itself is, for some time, not a search and therefore entirely free of
fourth amendment restraint; after some duration – 28 days in Jones 52 – the
monitoring becomes a search and demands the full panoply of fourth
amendment justifications – a warrant and probable cause.
Law is full of discontinuities, but this one is striking and unfortunate. The
variable of time is so perfectly continuous that distinctions the court creates seem
arbitrary. If Time D is the moment dividing non-search locational monitoring
from a search, we lack even the fiction of a qualitative difference between Time D
minus 5 minutes and Time D plus 5 minutes. Another reason for the
unseemliness is the difficulty of squaring any selection with the doctrinal
formula “reasonable expectations of privacy.” 53 At least if reasonable
expectations are supposed to be tied in some way to actual expectations, it seem
unlikely that American expectations change sharply at any particular moment in
the continuum of monitoring duration. 54 But the main difficulty, I contend, is

Id. at 964 (suggesting that locational monitoring for “a very long period” is a
search). The plurality reasoning is significant because it could in the future command a
majority; the other five justices avoided the issue only by deciding the case on narrower
grounds that happened to be available on the facts. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
held that the attachment of the GPS device was itself a search because it was a physical
intrusion upon Jones’ property rights in his car. Id. at 948-54.
51 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). See Richard H. McAdams, Note,
“Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights,”
71 Va. L. Rev. 297 (1985).
52 Jones, at 948.
53 The language defining a search famously originates with Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) and is subsequently
endorsed by the Court in various opinions. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
33 (2001) (“[A] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”).
54
For evidence to the contrary, see Matthew B. Kugler and Lior Strahilevitz,
“Surveillance Duration Doesn't Affect Privacy Expectations: An Empirical Test of the
Mosaic Theory” (2015), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629373
(finding that duration does not affect the expectations of locational privacy for the large
majority of survey respondents).
50
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how much depends on the difference in time. A Terry stop may, by the passage
of time, become an arrest. 55 But the practical difference for law enforcement is
only that police need reasonable suspicion for the former but probable cause for
the latter. 56 When the timing issue is posed as in Jones, however, we move from
initially requiring no justification for the monitoring to abruptly requiring
probable cause plus a warrant. In fourth amendment terms, we go from
requiring nothing to requiring everything. 57
The plurality reasoning in Jones would be more persuasive if it minimized
the significance of this strong discontinuity, which it could manage by
recognizing two categories of locational searching and reinterpreting Knotts.
Instead of saying there was no search in Knotts (as the Court there reasoned), one
could say that it was a low-intensity locational search, the type justified merely
by reasonable suspicion that Knotts was transporting contraband, a standard
easily met on the facts of the case. By contrast, the multi-week monitoring in
Jones is not low intensity or cursory, but a full-fledged (locational) search
requiring a warrant and probable cause. So the variable of time only affects how
demanding the fourth amendment requirements are, not whether the fourth
amendment applies at all. Although the time spans are presumably different, it
would operate like the time difference between a Terry stop and an arrest, which
defines the line between the requirements of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause. 58

See, e.g., Robinson, supra, at 253-54 (“A Terry stop involves a momentary
encounter between officer and suspect, while an in-custody arrest places the two in close
proximity for a much longer period of time.”); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685
(1985) (“Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at some point it can no
longer be justified as an investigative stop.”); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212
(1979) (finding that longer duration of the police encounter with suspect, and movement
away from the initial scene of encounter, characterize arrest requiring probable cause).
Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (finding that 90-minute detention of
luggage required probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion).
56 See Terry, supra; Sharpe, supra.
57 Well, almost everything, but not as much cause as surgery requires.
58 Other cases might benefit from this recharacterization. Arguably, Bond v.
United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) is a non-technological example. There, police squeezed
and manipulated soft luggage in the overhead rack of a bus, and the majority held it to be
a search requiring a warrant and probable cause. A dissent by Justice Breyer, joined by
Justice Scalia, challenged the claim that the police did anything beyond what members of
the public would do when moving someone else’s luggage to make room for their own.
Id., at 339-43. But there was clear opportunity to recognize that this kind of tactile
55
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Proportional rules are more complex, requiring two doctrinal lines: (1) the
line between no search and a cursory search and (2) the line between a cursory
search and a full search. But the complexity allows for more refined tradeoffs and
lessens the discontinuity by providing a more proportionate response. 59 If
triggering fourth amendment protection always requires a warrant and probable
cause, the decision to recognize a search is particularly costly. Effectively, the
police must wait until they have cause to arrest a person before they can monitor
his or her public movements (beyond some time period). If that is the only
option, then the Court will withhold placing that burden on law enforcement
until the government has engaged in locational monitoring for an extended
duration. By contrast, if there is a category of low-intensity searches that triggers
only the requirement of reasonable suspicion, then the Court will be willing to go
back in time to impose it, possibly to the very beginning of GPS monitoring. 60
Unless the government is engaged in a locational dragnet (monitoring everyone
or a substantial part of the population), it probably only engages in electronic
manipulation, even if it exceeds what members of the public do, falls short of an ordinary
search involving visual inspection and could therefore require the lesser justification of
reasonable suspicion (which was probably present in the case). Again, however, neither
the majority nor the dissent thought it worthwhile there to complicate the categories.
59 See Terry, supra, at 17 (“[B]y suggesting a rigid all-or-nothing model of
justification and regulation under the [Fourth] Amendment, [the government’s
argument] obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of
police action as a means of constitutional regulation.”). For a general defense of
proportionality in the fourth amendment, see Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The
New Government Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment 21-48 (2007) (discussing the
proportionality principle). See also Christopher Slobogin, “Making the Most of United
States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2098002##, at 14 (“In Jones itself,
Justice Alito’s distinction between “prolonged” and short-term tracking could be seen as
an application of the proportionality idea.”).
Of course, it is also true that, with two search categories, the Court could
require a longer duration before characterizing the monitoring as a full-fledged search
requiring a warrant and probable cause. Indeed, some Supreme Court Justices might
prefer to require only reasonable suspicion for any duration of locational search.
Commentators who would disagree with this outcome might therefore strategically
prefer on this issue (and others) that the Court be forced to pick between recognizing a
search and requiring a warrant or recognizing no search and leaving the matter entirely
unregulated, because they might think it will force the Court to require the warrant
earlier in the locational surveillance. My point is simply that that, abstracting from these
political issues, one-size-fits-all inflexibility is not inevitably or even likely the best
approach. If you can draw the lines in the right places, two lines are sometimes better
than one.
60
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monitoring when it has reasonable suspicion, so calling that a limited search may
impose minimal costs on government (other than to prevent dragnets).
Of course, there is no magic to the number two. In a given context, one
might prefer to have three or more subcategories of search. Indeed, one might
dispense with discontinuous categories entirely and judge each search on its own
merits by some sort of reasonableness balancing. That is essentially what the
Court does when it analyzes a search under the “special needs” doctrine. 61 But
there are obvious advantages to categorical rules, and to simpler rather than
more complex rules, to be weighed against the precise results that a standard
enables. The point of this article is not to identify the optimal level of complexity
for subcategories of fourth amendment searches, but merely to demonstrate the
superiority of a more complex rule than the one the Court articulated in Riley.
My main aim with the hasty analysis of this Part is to frame the decision in Riley,
to show one way in which Riley fits in with the other cases. Now I will turn to the
merits of the scope-limited search of a cell phone, beginning with how to
formulate the rule.
II. DEFINING A SCOPE-LIMITED CELL PHONE SEARCH
In Riley, the United States and California argued for several alternatives
to the warrant requirement for searching a cell phone incident to arrest. I will
review the more promising options and identify what I think is the best scopelimited rule. 62 In the next Part, I will consider the merits of the rule.
As the first alternative, the government proposed that the Court permit,
by analogy to Gant, “a warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell phone whenever it
is reasonable to believe that the phone contains evidence of the crime of arrest.” 63
By itself, this would place only a minor limitation on when police could search a
cell phone and no limit on the scope of the search. Because the phone contains so
much historical information about one’s movements, messages, contacts, etc.,
many people who commit a crime will leave evidence of it on their phone; police
See sources cited at n. [15].
I do not discuss two options the governments raised. In the brief, the United
States also suggested a rule under which the police are always allowed to examine a cell
phone’s call log incident to arrest. At oral argument, California suggested a rule of
analogy, as the Court put it: “officers could search cell phone data if they could have
obtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart.” Riley, at 2493. I find these
arguments unappealing for the reasons the Court provides.
63 Id at 2492.
61
62
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will frequently have reason to expect to find it. Roberts goes further, stating: “It
would be a particularly inexperienced or unimaginative law enforcement officer
who could not come up with several reasons to suppose evidence of just about
any crime could be found on a cell phone.” 64 As a result, the Gant rule, by itself,
would allow police “unbridled discretion to rummage at will.” 65
Roberts exaggerates. 66 The Gant rule would place some constraint on
police, at least if the Court had demanded not merely that it be conceivable that
the cell phone contains evidence of the crime of arrest, but that there is a
reasonable (i.e., non-trivial) probability that it does. One would not expect to find
in the phone’s messages, photos, web searches, or apps evidence for the traffic
offense of not wearing a seat belt. Nor should we expect to find there evidence
for crimes of opportunity, such as embezzlement, shoplifting, or a sudden bar
fight. One might reply that the phone could contain texts or emails revealing the
intent to commit the crime or an admission after the fact. But without something
more (given that the crimes require no cooperation of others), the purely
speculative possibility is not a “reason to believe” the evidence exists. Or so the
Court could have declared.
But what about locational data? Perhaps there is always reason to believe
the locational data is evidence of the crime of arrest, as long as the crime was
committed in a specific location. The officer specifies that he arrested the
defendant for a stated crime committed on a particular road or in a particular
workplace, store, or bar. The phone confirms that the defendant was present at
that road, workplace, store, or bar at the time when the officer says the crime was
committed.
With a little innovation, this result is not too difficult to avoid. The Court
could have stated that the expectation of locational data is itself insufficient to
justify a cell phone search in cases where there is no reason to expect location to
be disputed. In other words, the anticipated evidence must have some practical
value. When the defendant is arrested for embezzling from his regular employer,
he is not going to defend himself by saying that he was never present in his place
Id. Roberts also says that Gant is distinguishable because of the unique
circumstances of being a car search. Id. That distinction hardly answers the policy issues
that are my focus.
65 Id.
66 If Roberts is literally correct, he casts doubt onto Gant itself because it is
becoming increasingly common for cars to have built-in, on-board computers, which can
contain extensive locational information and email.
64
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of employment when he obviously was (or at least there is no “reason to believe”
he will). Thus, the police cannot justify warrantlessly searching the cell phone
incident to arrest by saying it will show the suspect to have regularly visited his
workplace, when his being at work is not in dispute. When police arrest the
defendant at the scene of the crime – the shop where the theft occurred; the bar
where the fight occurred – there is no expected practical value to the locational
data on the defendant’s phone because the police and other witnesses can testify
to his obvious presence. Or, again, the Court could have so declared in creating a
category of scope-limited search incident to arrest. 67
Nonetheless, Roberts is correct to think that the Gant-limitation, by itself,
would be quite permissive. To prevent unbridled rummaging in many cases, we
would need a limitation on the scope of the search: not merely when, but how the
police can look through the phone incident to arrest. The Solicitor General’s next
argument addressed this point, claiming that the scope of the search could be
limited, as the Court later described it, to “those areas of the phone where an
officer reasonably believes that information relevant to the crime, the arrestee’s
identity, or officer safety will be discovered.” 68 This is the idea of a cursory
inspection or “frisk” of a phone.
Various lower courts had embraced this idea and the circumstances of
those cases provide useful illustrations. In one Seventh Circuit case, the police
had examined the phone, incident to arrest, solely to determine the operational
number assigned to the phone, limiting their examination to the cursory search
needed to acquire that information. 69 Judge Posner upheld the validity of the
search precisely because of its triviality, reserving for “another day” the
permissibility of a “more extensive search.” 70 In a Massachusetts case, the
Supreme Court upheld a phone search limited to “a simple examination of the
recent call list,” emphasizing that “no further intrusion into the telephone's
contents occurred.” 71 The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a search accessing
the specific text messages an undercover officer had sent the defendant earlier on
Cf. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)(holding on the facts of the
case that there was no testimonial content to the act of producing papers in response to
subpoena because “[t]he existence and location of the papers are a foregone
conclusion.”). Personal location is often a “foregone conclusion,” so the evidence has no
value to the government.
68 Riley, at 2492.
69 U.S. v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.)
70 Id. at 810.
71 Commonwealth v. Phifer, 463 Mass. 790 (2012).
67
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the day of the arrest, confirming that she was the person with whom he had been
communicating about an (undercover) drug transaction. The court noted: “’[A
cell phone] search must be limited as much as is reasonably practicable by the
object of the search.’ That will usually mean that an officer may not conduct a
‘fishing expedition’ and sift through all of the data stored in the cell phone.“ 72
Given that this was a common approach below, it is surprising how
briefly, in a long opinion, the Court explains its rejection of the compromise rule:
“This approach would again impose few meaningful constraints on officers. The
proposed categories would sweep in a great deal of information, and officers
would not always be able to discern in advance what information would be
found where.” 73 In his concurrence, Justice Alito also briefly rejects the scopelimited rule, stating:
I do not see a workable alternative. Law enforcement officers need
clear rules regarding searches incident to arrest, and it would take
many cases and many years for the courts to develop more
nuanced rules. And during that time, the nature of the electronic
devices that ordinary Americans carry on their persons would
continue to change. 74
These reasons are deeply unsatisfying. Defining and elaborating the
“cursory inspection” of a cell phone would, no doubt, require judicial time and
effort. But that is true of many or most judicially created rules. 75 Technological

Hawkins v. State, 290 Ga. 785, 788 (2012). See id. at 787–88 (“[T]he fact that a
large amount of information may be in a cell phone has substantial import as to the scope
of the permitted search . . . Thus, when ‘the object of the search is to discover certain text
messages, for instance, there is no need for the officer to sift through photos or audio files
or Internet browsing history data stored [in] the phone.’ Accordingly, reviewing the
reasonable scope of the search will largely be a fact-specific inquiry.”).
73 Riley, at 2492.
74 Id. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).
75 The same is also true of legislation, though the legislature might be the better
institution for formulating such rules. Alito makes this point in his concurrence, stating
that he would reconsider the constitutionality of warrantless cell phone searches incident
to arrest if Congress or state legislatures, after gathering appropriate information, were to
“enact legislation that draws reasonable distinctions based on categories of information
or perhaps other variables.” Id. Alito seems to advocate what John Rappaport calls
“second order” regulation, where the Court encourages other branches to operate as the
primary regulators of the police. See John Rappaport, “Second-Order Regulation of Law
Enforcement,” 103 Cal. L. Rev. 205 (2015). In this article, I take as given the judicial role in
72
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change complicates the project of defining scope-limitations, but the evolution of
technology will challenge fourth amendment rules in any event (as in this case),
and the concept of a cursory digital search might prove useful as that happens.
I find it particularly difficult to take seriously the idea that this rule
would be less workable than other fourth amendment rules, or indeed, the
current doctrine of searches incident to arrest, which borders on the incoherent.
Starting with Robinson, Supreme Court doctrine justifies allowing the search of
containers incident to arrest by the risk that the arrestee will access weapons or
tamper with evidence. But, as Alito observed in his concurrence, once the officer
knows the container does not hold a weapon, the risks of tampering are fully
avoided by having the officer secure the container without searching it. Given
the rationale, therefore, the officer should seek a warrant before searching the
container, i.e., the rule in Riley. Yet Robinson continues to permit an unlimited
and warrantless container search incident to arrest. Unless, of course, the
container is an automobile, where, in Gant, Scalia succeeded in introducing a
different idea. Once the arrestee is secure, Gant authorizes searches of the vehicle,
not to prevent access to weapons or evidence tampering, but to further the
investigation by finding evidence of criminality, though limited to evidence of
the crime of arrest. Scalia would prefer that this doctrine would apply generally
to govern searches of non-automobile containers and houses. But Gant held its
rule to be limited to the context of vehicles, as Riley points out.
Thus, we have three competing doctrines regarding warrantless searches
of containers incident to arrest: (1) the permissibility of a full search (Robinson),
(2) the permissibility of a scope-limited search (Gant), and, now, (3) the
impermissibility of any search absent another warrant exception (Riley). So
understood, the virtue of simplicity would favor placing cell phones in category
2 and avoiding the creation of a new category 3. Indeed, as I suggest below, one
advantage of defining a scope-limited search of a cell phone is that the
momentum towards this category might, in the future, have facilitated the
transfer of other search objects (namely, “papers”) from the Robinson regime of
category 1 to the Gant regime of category 2. In any event, it is not the case that
the Court had to reject the governments’ compromise rules in Riley in order to
preserve the simplicity and coherence of its search-incident doctrine.

specifying the constitutionally minimal standards, and that doing so will make it the
primary regulator of police when the legislature is inactive.
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The above quotation from Roberts raises the separate concern that
“officers would not always be able to discern in advance what information
would be found where.” 76 That is no doubt true. Clever criminals may hide or
encode information; they might use programs to scramble the dates of messages
and photos. But it is the nature of any cursory search or seizure that the officer
cannot guarantee success. If police stop a person based only on reasonable
suspicion, but can neither confirm nor dispel that suspicion, after the passage of
some amount of time, the Terry-stop must come to an end. 77 Without probable
cause, the police cannot continue to detain the suspect in a way tantamount to
arrest. The same is true here. The police have some limited time to look in
relevant places to find what evidence they have reason to believe exists. The
failure to find it promptly undermines the reason to believe it is present and, in
any event, eventually exhausts the time available. At that point, even with a
scope-limited exception, the officer has to get a warrant.
Finally, from Alito, we receive the familiar trope of needing “clear rules”
for police. Depending on one’s general attitude, it is frustrating or amusing that
Supreme Court opinions trumpet the simple-rules-the-police-can-understand
argument whenever a justice favors a bright-line rule over a standard, but the
opinions then ignore the point whenever a justice adopts or applies one of its
open-ended standards. To do their jobs constitutionally, police must understand
the fundamental concepts of “probable cause” and “reasonable suspicion.” Those
are not rules but standards based on a totality of circumstances. 78 The doctrines
for when police have seized a person, when the seizure is an arrest, and when
they have received consent for a search – all fundamental to police work – are
also governed by a totality of circumstances standard. 79 If police can understand
Id. at 2492.
See sources cited supra note [51].
78 Regarding probable cause, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Maryland
v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003). Regarding reasonable suspicion, see Terry, supra; United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
79 For the definition of a seizure of a person, see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980). Regarding the distinction between the seizure that is an investigatory stop
under Terry (justified by reasonable suspicion) and the greater seizure that is an arrest
(justified by probable cause), see United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)
(“Admittedly, Terry, Dunaway, Royer, and Place, considered together, may in some
instances create difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop
from a de facto arrest.”). For cases defining consent, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). As the Court has revived the
76
77

21

these evolving standards, one needs a better reason to reject the proposed
standard of a limited cell phone search than the idea that police require simple
rules. 80
The inconsistency between fourth amendment rules and fourth
amendment standards arises in this very case. Roberts emphasizes that, despite
its general holding, the police can search a cell phone incident to arrest (or
otherwise, presumably) when there is an exigency. The Court states:
In light of the availability of the exigent circumstances exception,
there is no reason to believe that law enforcement officers will not
be able to address some of the more extreme hypotheticals that
have been suggested: a suspect texting an accomplice who, it is
feared, is preparing to detonate a bomb, or a child abductor who
may have information about the child’s location on his cell
phone. 81
Yet no bright line rule defines the parameters of exigent circumstances; exigency
is judged by a standard of immediate need.

relevance of trespass to the Fourth Amendment, a similarly open-ended question is
whether the police are engaged in a licensed or unlicensed use of property. See Florida v.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-17 (2013).
80 One might reply that the Court favors rules by using them whenever possible,
employing standards only where there is no workable rule. To the contrary, however, the
Court is not so consistent. On numerous occasions, lower courts have formulated
plausible rules about probable cause, seizures, and consent searches in some recurrent
context only to be reversed by the Court, which insisted on a totality-of-circumstances
standard. See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013)(rejecting lower court efforts to
define specific rules for when dog sniffs generate probable cause); Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (rejecting lower court efforts to define specific rules for when a stopped
motorist gives valid consent); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991) (rejecting
lower court rules for determining when an investigatory tactic is a seizure); Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988)(same); Sharp, supra (rejecting a per se rule
specifying the maximum permissible duration of a Terry-stop). The Court abandoned its
own successful efforts to make rules to define probable cause in a recurrent situation. See
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (abandoning Aguilar’s and Spinelli’s rules
specifying when anonymous tips can generate probable cause). Michael Coenen uses
these fourth amendment cases as central examples in discussing the odd rule he discerns
from Supreme Court precedent: that some standards may not be clarified by rules. See
Michael Coenen, “Rules Against Rulification,” 124 Yale L.J. 576 (2014).
81

Riley, at 2494.
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The standard is easily applied to the two textbook examples the Court
offers. For many cases, however, there is much uncertainty for police. For
example, suppose that 24 hours ago, a pair of men committed a felony, a robbery,
arson, rape, or the theft of some weapons or art. Today, based on probable cause,
the police arrest one suspect. Do we have an exigency simply because the other
perpetrator is at large? If the crime is a theft, do we have an exigency because the
stolen weapons or art is still missing? Presumably not. What if the police also see
the arrestee using his phone right before they make contact, perhaps trying to
send a text before the police can take the phone? What if the pair is believed to be
serial offenders, so there might be another crime today, or the police have reason
to think the other suspect could flee the jurisdiction? Or what if the facts are like
one of the cases in Riley (the defendant Wurie): after the arrest, the phone keeps
ringing. 82 Does it matter if the incoming call is labeled “Boss” or “Bro”?
These questions are difficult. There is no bright line defining exigency.
Yet even when we have determined that an exigency exists, we must move to a
second question: what kind of cell phone search does the exigency justify? Does
it mean the police can now rummage through all the contents of the phone? Not
at all. Basic doctrine says that if an exigency justifies the search, the search is
limited by the exigency. 83 In Hicks, for example, the police could enter an
apartment based on the exigency of a recent shooting, but could only look in
places where the shooter or a weapon could fit. 84 In general, the exigency limits
police to looking in the places where they might expect to find evidence the
contingency makes relevant. To take one of the Court’s examples, if the police are
looking for the kidnap victim, and the victim was taken two days ago, the
information they need is in the locational data of the past two days, and it is
likely that police can also examine texts or phone calls of the same time period
(given that kidnapping usually involves cooperating criminals). Perhaps the
exigency also allows the police to go back some period before the kidnapping
occurred. Defining that time period requires an open-ended inquiry that the
exigency standard is used to resolve. The exigency exception thus requires the

Riley, at 2481.
See Mincey v. Arizona, supra, at 393 (noting in a case involving the search of a
murder scene that “a warrantless search must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation,’” citing Terry); Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559
(2013); Kentucky v. King, 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011).
84 Hicks, supra, at 324–25.
82
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very scope-limitation which is supposedly too taxing for the courts to create and
too complicated for police to follow.
In addition, various judges thought it possible to develop a law of cursory
phone searches. The governments cited those cases, a few of which were
mentioned above, in their briefs. A few months after the Riley decision, the
Canadian Supreme Court reached the same issue in Regina v. Fearon. 85 That Court
fashioned a rule permitting a scope-limited search: Assuming that the arrest is
lawful, and that the cell phone search be “truly incidental to the arrest,” the
Court also required that police have “a valid law enforcement purpose to
conduct the search” and that “the nature and the extent of the search are tailored
to the purpose of the search.” 86 The Court was serious enough about the scopelimitation that it added a process requirement that “police take detailed notes of
what they have examined on the device and how it was searched.” 87 In context, it
appears that these notes need be nearly contemporaneous with the search. The
notes are an independent requirement; if the police don’t take notes, it cannot
meet its burden of proving the search to be within the permitted scope. In Fearon,
the police had not taken notes, not yet having been informed of this rule, and so
the Court held the cell phone search to be unlawful (though, in the end, it did not
exclude the evidence). 88

Fearon, supra.
Id. at 83.
87 Id.
88 Id. The court offered this summary of its holding:
[P]olice officers will not be justified in searching a cell phone or similar
device incidental to every arrest. Rather, such a search will comply [with
Canadian constitutional law] where:
(1) The arrest was lawful;
(2) The search is truly incidental to the arrest in that the police have a
reason based on a valid law enforcement purpose to conduct the search,
and that reason is objectively reasonable. The valid law enforcement
purposes in this context are:
(a) Protecting the police, the accused, or the public;
(b) Preserving evidence; or
(c) Discovering evidence, including locating additional suspects,
in situations in which the investigation will be stymied or
significantly hampered absent the ability to promptly search the
cell incident to arrest;
(3) The nature and the extent of the search are tailored to the purpose
of the search; and
85
86
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Fearon offer a plausible definition for a cursory search of a cell-phone.
One might disagree with how the court limited the ends of the search merely to
any objectively “valid law enforcement purpose” (which was similar to the
Solicitor General’s second proposal in Riley 89). It would be better to use the
narrower limitation of Gant: the goal of securing evidence of the crime of arrest.
The Fearon court properly insists on the means being narrowly tailored to achieve
the legitimate ends, limiting the “nature and extent” of the search, including the
issue of time. Worth considering is the requirement that police take notes
indicating the reasons for and scope of their search, which obviously facilitates
judicial review of the scope limitations, but has no American precedent, as far as
I can determine.
Thus, the threshold for the warrantless search I am proposing is a reason
to believe the cell phone contains useful evidence of the crime of arrest; the scope
is a brief examination of the part of the phone that the police reasonably believe
can contain such evidence. The police should be limited to examining the phone
promptly after the arrest, which means in the field, not in the police crime lab. If
the crime is recent, the search should ordinarily be limited to a recent time
period. In the normal case, if the crime was committed in the past few hours or
days, the police are fishing if they go back a year or a month. Thus, a court can
prevent general rummaging by identifying it where it exists. The task of defining
scope-limitations would require some common law refinement of the standard
over time, but it could obviously be done.
To summarize, I propose that the Court should have permitted police to
conduct a brief field search of a cell phone, without a warrant, when it is incident
to a valid arrest, there is reason to believe that the phone contains useful
evidence of the crime of arrest, and the police limit their search to the places
where such evidence might realistically be found. With that definition in mind, I
now turn to the case for granting police the power of a low intensity search of a
cell phone incident to arrest.

(4) The police take detailed notes of what they have examined on the
device and how it was searched.
Id.
89

See TAN [68].
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III. THE ADVANTAGES OF A SCOPE-LIMITED CELL PHONE SEARCH
I offer four arguments for the scope-limited rule I have defined. The
starting point is a discussion of the normative basis for Figure 1. Is there any
good reason for varying the number of search categories with the target of the
search? I argue there is such a reason and that it points toward a more nuanced
rule for cell phones. Second, I evaluate the eternal “balance” of law enforcement
and the values of the fourth amendment, contending that it favors a compromise
rule. 90 Third, I consider how Riley produces an unfortunate doctrinal anomaly –
the differential treatment of digital and analog “papers” – that the scope-limited
search would narrow. Finally, I predict that Riley may produce an unintended
negative consequence – loosening of the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement.
A. Higher Stakes Justify Scope-Limited Rules
Is there a normative theory that can explain Figure 1? Why should the
law recognize more categories of a search in some context than in others? The
obvious answer that I propose is that the complexity of the rule should depend
on the stakes involved for privacy and law enforcement. When the stakes for
both are low, the optimal rule is simple, because it matters less that the rule gets
some cases wrong, given the cost of a more complex rule. Where the stakes are
high on one side and low on the other, the optimal rule is still likely to be simple,
in favor of the side where the stakes are much higher. For example, if the privacy
stakes of a category of search are high and the law enforcement stakes are low,
we should expect a simple rule offering strong protections against search. But the
final case of interest is where the stakes are high on both sides, privacy and law
enforcement. Here, it is likely that the optimal rule is more complex. 91
We might guess that the stakes are particularly high for searches of
persons and homes, two areas in which the Court recognizes a distinction
between ordinary searches and some kind of low-intensity search. The privacy or
See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) (“Where [the
historical] inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under
traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”).
91 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, “Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis,” 42
Duke L.J. 557 (1992); Francesco Parisi, “Rules versus Standards,” The Encyclopedia of
Public Choice 835 (2004).
90
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liberty interest is particularly high when it involves one’s bodily integrity; the
stakes are especially high when it involves the home, i.e., the property one
expects to serve as a refuge, a place of relative isolation from the world. At the
same time, the law enforcement stakes were high in both Terry and Buie because
the purpose of the frisk (of the person or house) was to identify immediate
threats to the safety of the police officer. The high privacy stakes push against a
simple rule requiring no additional justification for the frisk; the high law
enforcement stakes push against a simple rule requiring probable cause and
warrant. The compromise rule – a lesser form of search (frisk) justified by a lesser
level of justification (reasonable suspicion) – is more complicated and costly, but
justified by the error costs of the simple rule. 92
The search of property in Arizona v. Hicks is harder to classify. Given that
the police are already lawfully inside the apartment, the privacy interests are
limited to their inspection of personal property, which for things that are not
papers, is generally less serious than that the interest involved in searching one’s
body or home. The law enforcement interest is also plausibly less. First, there is
no issue of police safety. Second, the main use of a cursory inspection of
appliances would be, as in Hicks, to find the serial number to identify if the goods
were stolen. Unless they were stolen in the course of a deadly robbery, the law
enforcement interest in detecting theft is moderate, not at all trivial but not of the
highest importance. Thus, the case for creating a scope-limited rule was weaker
than in Terry or Buie. 93 None of this is to say that Hicks came out the right way; I
still believe the dissent had the stronger argument. But the case is a close one and

On this analysis, the result in Michigan v. Long arises from the fact that the law
enforcement stakes are high (officer safety), while the privacy stakes are not so high (a
brief search for weapons in the subset of the passenger area of a car in which the suspect
might grab a weapon).
92

Although I am mentioning the severity of crime as being relevant for picking
the doctrine, I assume that the scope-limited rule I advocate would not be applied
differentially depending on the seriousness of the crime. I instead assume and follow the
conventional assumption that fourth amendment doctrine is trans-substantive rule. See
William J. Stuntz, Essay, “Local Policing After the Terror,” 111 Yale L.J. 2137, 2140 (2002)
(“[M]ost constitutional limits on policing are transsubstantive -- they apply equally to
suspected drug dealers and suspected terrorists.”). For an exchange of normative views
on the transsubstantive basis of fourth amendment doctrine, see Jeffrey Bellin, “CrimeSeverity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a
Changing World,” 97 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (2011); Christopher Slobogin, “Why Crime Severity
Analysis is Not Reasonable,” 97 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 1 (2012).
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the above analysis shows that one could justify the distinction from Terry and
Buie. 94
Where do cell phones fit this analysis? A cell phone is a container for an
immense number of digital “papers,” documents of one’s messages, images,
location, etc. As Riley explains, the privacy stakes in these digital papers are
extremely high, obviously much higher than for an appliance serial number.
What about the law enforcement interests? On the rule/standard theory I am
offering, the Court’s decision – a simple rule strongly protecting fourth
amendment rights by requiring a warrant – would make sense if the law
enforcement interests were low. Yet I don’t think they are. First, there is the
possibility that an arrestee recently communicated on the phone with criminal
confederates who might be on their way to the scene, posing a threat to the
officer. Second, the very fact that there is pervasive private information on one’s
cell phone means that, when the owner is guilty of the crime of arrest, it is highly
likely to contain highly probative evidence of that crime, and this relationship is
likely to hold for very serious crimes. Thus, the stakes are high on both sides. The
search of a cell phone is therefore more like Terry and Buie. High stakes on both
sides make it easier to justify a more complex rule, one that distinguishes
ordinary searches from cursory searches, and requires more justification for the
former than the latter.
The point about optimal rule complexity is fairly abstract. Now let us
move to a more pragmatic balancing of costs and benefits.
B. Balancing Privacy and Law Enforcement
When the issue turns on balancing, as it often does, the frustrating reality
of fourth amendment law is that we usually have nothing but our intuitions.
Whether the constitutional value at issue is defined as privacy (as I will assume),
autonomy, property, dignity, security, or something else, we have no good way
of measuring the loss of that value when the rule permits greater government

One might justify the Hicks outcome on other grounds, while still rejecting the
logic of “a search is a search.” Where police safety is not in issue, perhaps cursory
searches incident to arrest or of items in plain view should always be limited by a
connection to the crime of arrest or the exigency justifying the home entry that puts the
item in plain view (i.e., whatever justifies the initial warrantless search or seizure), as we
see in Gant. In Hicks, the police search of the stereo was unrelated to the exigent
circumstances justifying entry into the apartment. I thank Chris Slobogin for this point.
94
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intrusion. Sometimes there are empirical studies of privacy expectations, 95 which
are a valuable start, but we lack a good way of assigning a weight to a loss of any
particular kind of privacy, and we are in even worse shape with many other
values. On the other side we have the law enforcement interest. The problem
here seems more tractable; in principle, criminologists could quantify the crime
reduction (or increased clearance rate or cost savings) attributable to a particular
police practice. Yet social science still debates the value of more basic things, like
whether adding police decreases crime, 96 so it is not surprising that there is no
empirical consensus on the effect of specific police tactics. When the job is
balancing, it would be good if the evidence permitted a serious cost-benefit
analysis, but courts and commentators can only offer intuition.
So here is my intuition, with the brevity it deserves: the privacy losses of
cursory cell phone searches are outweighed by the law enforcement gains. First,
as Riley describes, 97 much of the privacy concern about cell phones is what could
be reconstructed about a person if the police are allowed to excavate the entire
phone, piecing together locational information, contacts, messages, photos,
search history, etc. That sort of comprehensive search and mosaic reconstruction
is in almost all cases beyond the capability of an officer in the field limited by
time and the places to be searched (related to the crime of arrest). 98 No doubt, an
officer may come across a recent message or photo that is, by itself, embarrassing
and revealing of intimate information. But, as I emphasize in section III-C, that
risk exists in the world of analog searches incident to arrest, which are still

See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher, “Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look
at ‘Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,’” 42 Duke L.J. 727 (1993);
Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Strahilevitz, Surveillance Duration Doesn't Affect Privacy
Expectations: An Empirical Test of the Mosaic Theory (July 10, 2015), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629373.
96 See, e.g., Ben Vollaard and Joseph Hamed, “Why the Police Have an Effect on
Violent Crime After All: Evidence from the British Crime Survey.” 55 J. Law & Econ. 901
(2012).
95

Riley, supra, at 2489.
See Stephen E. Henderson, “Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance after
United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach,” 103 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 803 (2013); David Gray and Danielle Keats Citron, “A Shattered Looking
Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy,” 14
N.C. J. L. & Tech. 381 (2013); Orin S. Kerr, “The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth
Amendment,” 111 Mich. L. Rev. 311 (2012).
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governed by Robinson. What is special about cell phones is mostly not at issue in
a cursory field search.
Second, police work depends on persistent timeliness – a promptness in
identifying and following up leads. When a person is arrested, there may be a
limited time to find co-conspirators or witnesses who will, upon learning of the
arrest, flee or hide. There may be limited time to find evidence that may be
moved or destroyed and to uncover plans for future crimes. In Fearon, when the
police arrested one robber, but the other robber, the stolen money, and the
firearm were still missing, the Canadian Supreme Court thought that good police
work involved the immediate search of the phone. 99 The same was true of the
other lower court cases discussed above: they endorsed the police immediately
following up leads. 100
Against my argument here are two responses. The first is Roberts’
observation about the existence of the exigent circumstance exception. 101 Perhaps
the exception will desirably allow a warrantless search in cases like Fearon, but
not allow warrantless searches in cases without exigency.
My rejoinder is that, unless the exigency doctrine changes (for the worse,
as I argue in Part III-D), it only solves a small part of the problem. An exigency is
based on a specific threat of evidence destruction or flight or something else. In
Fearon, the police did not have any specific evidence that the particular co-felon
involved had been alerted of the arrest or was in the process of fleeing, nor that
the particular money or gun were about to be moved, hidden, or destroyed. 102
Instead, the police had, as they frequently would, a general concern that co-felons
will be tipped off before the police can get to them, giving them time to put
themselves and the evidence beyond the reach of police. Similarly, the fact that
the arrestee’s phone rings after the arrest is not convincing evidence of exigency,
but answering the call or promptly accessing the phone to determine its origin
seems like a pretty good police practice, with the potential to create new leads. 103
Fearon, supra.
See Hawkins, Phifer, Flores-Lopez.
101 Riley, supra, at 2494.
102 Fearon, supra, at xx.
103 This scenario is similar to the facts of Wurie in Riley. There the arrestee’s
phone repeatedly received an incoming call from a source the labeled as “my house.” See
id. at 2481. In the court below, the dissenter argued that these facts created an exigency
justifying the search of the phone. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
2013) (Howard, J., dissenting). Yet the claim of exigency here is very weak and supports
99
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It is productive, as a matter of routine police work, to discover the names and
locations of co-felons as quickly as possible, which in some cases a cursory search
will uniquely achieve.
I don’t know how often one of these hidden exigency scenarios arises, but
consider a list of the possibilities. Over the course of all arrests, there will be a
number of cases where, despite the absence of specific grounds for suspicion, the
arrestee has recently used the cell phone to send to, or receive from, co-felons a
message regarding the crime. The message might reveal ongoing efforts to flee or
hide evidence or the confederates’ expectation of an immediate text from the
arrestee confirming that all is well, the absence of which will trigger such
efforts. 104 In some additional percentage of cases, the criminal confederates will
not be tipped off, but the arrestee’s phone will have unknown time-sensitive
information about their temporary location or plans for an imminent new crime,
one that police can thwart only if they search the phone immediately. When
there is reason to believe the phone contains useful evidence of the crime of
arrest, particularly when there are unaccounted for co-felons, weapons, or
evidence, the best routine practice upon securing the arrestee may be to
promptly check the arrestee’s phone for recent messages (calls, emails, texts) to
see if any of these scenarios is playing out. The scope-limited search defined
above will permit enough searching to discover these types of evidence with
some high frequency. The exigent circumstances, by contrast, permits the
warrantless search only when police already have specific evidence that one of
these scenarios is present.
The second response to the law enforcement point I am making is that
police can routinely search the phone incident to arrest if they routinely get a
warrant, which can become standard practice for all arrests. And with telephonic

my claim in Part III-D that the effect of Riley will be to weaken the standards for
exigency, as discussed there. If there were an exigency here, a crucial fact in support
would be that the incoming call was labeled (readable on the outside of the phone) as
“my house.” Even the dissenter would appear to concede that there would be no
exigency for calls not so labelled, yet there would be investigative value to answering
any incoming call on the arrestee’s phone received shortly after arrest.
See U.S. v. Flores-Lopez, supra note xx, (Posner, J.)(“The arrested suspect
might have prearranged with coconspirators to call them periodically and if they didn't
hear from him on schedule to take that as a warning that he had been seized, and to
scatter.”).
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warrants, the time delay need not be particularly long. 105 This is obviously an
important point, probably the best argument for Riley’s rejection of a
compromise rule. Consider a few replies.
There is a tradeoff between a serious warrant process, which will impede
the routine searches I advocate, and a non-serious warrant process, which is a
perfunctory and meaningless ritual. First, if the warrant requirement involves
serious consideration of probable cause to believe the particular phone contains
evidence of a crime, then it could easily prevent phone searches from being
routine. Roberts says that it take would be an unimaginative officer who could
not think of several types of evidence for the crime of arrest that might be on the
phone, but that does not have to mean that it is easy to demonstrate probable cause
to believe that the phone contains such evidence. If the warrant process is
serious, the police will frequently fail to justify even the most limited peek into
the phone.
Where there is probable cause, the warrant requirement necessitates
delay. The Riley briefs and opinion extensively discussed the worst case scenario
where delay makes the search impossible, for one of two reasons: (1) that the
phone, after a short time of disuse, becomes inaccessible without a password the
arrestee will not share; and (2) that the phone may be remotely wiped. 106 The
Court was ultimately not concerned about these matters given its assessment of
the technologies, especially the use of Faraday bags, 107 but (at the conference)
Mary Leary offered some cause for pessimism about these solutions. 108 Without
resolving the matter, one can say that technology is constantly changing, so it is
difficult to be certain that the delay of a warrant will not sometimes put the
contents of a phone beyond reach of the police. A cursory but immediate field
search may turn out to be a unique moment of access.
Even if there is a warrant and the police gain access to the phone, there is
delay. While new technology makes it faster to get warrants, it also accelerates
the ability of criminals to coordinate their activities and communicate the need to
destroy evidence or flee. It is not clear that the greater speed in warrants fully
compensates for the greater quickness in criminal efforts at concealment. One
possibility is that co-felons have an agreement to send a certain message
Riley, supra, at 2493.
Riley, supra, at 2486.
107 Id. at 2486–87.
108 [cite her conference paper in this volume]
105
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periodically to indicate that all is well, in which case the arrest will automatically
notify the co-felons whenever the next message is due and the arrestee doesn’t
send it. 109
And even if the information remains perfectly accessible, in the
aggregate, there is cost to delay. As explained above, when the evidence on the
phone is time sensitive, but the police don’t know there is an exigency, even brief
delay can cause the loss of suspects and evidence.
Now consider a different scenario. Magistrates may wind up granting the
request as a matter of course. If police routinely request warrants from the field
whenever they arrest someone possessing a phone, that will add millions of new
requests each year across the United States. 110 The pressure of those new warrant
requests may produce an assembly-line production of warrants. Many
magistrates may decide categorically that, unless it is clear that the arrestee is
innocent, or clear that a single person committed the crime of arrest by himself or
herself, there is always probable cause to search the arrestee’s phone, given the
likelihood do finding evidence pointing to confederates. But then there is little in
the way of individualized consideration of the cause for searching the phone and
it is not clear what the warrant requirement accomplishes.
Indeed, note the perverse incentive that may arise from requiring a
warrant for even the most cursory search. If, to check for unknown exigencies,
police will routinely request and magistrates will routinely grant warrants to
search the phone of arrestees, then Riley will produce deeper privacy invasions
compared to the rule I propose. With a scope-limited exception, the police will
routinely conduct a cursory search in the field and frequently, finding nothing of
interest, have no reason to seek a warrant. This seems likely because
approximately 95% of convictions come from a guilty plea. 111 After a scopelimited search, the police and prosecutor would be able to retain the phone and
maintain the option of getting a warrant if the defendant threatens to go to trial.
But a busy police force and prosecutor’s office would have better things to do
than to ask for a warrant for all the phones of defendants already pleading guilty
after they have already completed a cursory search and found nothing. If the
See Flores-Lopez, supra.
There were more than 12.1 million arrests in the United States in 2012. See
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.2012/persons-arrested/persons-arrested.
111 See http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=qa&iid=405.
109
110

33

price of taking the smallest peek inside the phone is a warrant, however, more
police will seek warrants and those warrants will allow and produce more
general rummaging. True, the warrants may themselves limit the scope of the
search, but because the information could be hidden anywhere (as Roberts says),
and the time for searching is not limited, the warrant-based search will be far
more intrusive than the cursory field search. This is all the more true if the
warrant allows police to make a complete copy of the phone.
In sum, for what it’s worth, my intuition is on the side of many lower
courts and the Canadian Supreme Court: the balancing favors allowing a
warrantless but cursory search of cell phones incident to arrest.
C. The Doctrinal Gap between Digital and “Analog” Searches
Consider next the doctrinal anomaly Riley creates. Justice Alito explains
in his concurrence that “It has long been accepted that written items found on the
person of an arrestee may be examined and used at trial.” 112 Here he cites a long
string of cases involving the warrantless search, incident to arrest, of a diary,
ledger, stack of bills, address book, notebook, wallet, meeting minutes, circular,
advertising matter, checkbook, set of “memoranda containing various names and
addresses,” and other “papers.” 113 These cases follow Robinson, which allows
warrantless searches of non-digital containers found on the person of the
arrestee: wallets, purses, backpacks, etc. As Alito argues, it would be easy
enough to secure papers found on a person or in their containers until such time
as a warrant is obtained. But the “analog” rule is that all the papers may be
thoroughly examined incident to arrest without a warrant. Riley’s new digital
rule is quite different.
One could explain this anomaly by the expedience of rule-making. Rules
are always over- and under-inclusive. So if it is easy to distinguish between
analog and digital material and if the former, on average, contains far less private
information than the latter, on average, then a different rule for each could make
sense. Yet, it is also not so difficult to distinguish “papers” (all the above
examples Alito references) from “effects” (e.g., weapons, drugs, cash, stolen
goods). So once the Riley Court decides to complicate the search-incident rule for
containers, one might have thought that a better distinction than analog vs.
digital would be effects vs. papers. I mean it would be pragmatically better for
112
113

Riley, supra, at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring).
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purposes of balancing, but the distinction would also be grounded more directly
in the text of the fourth amendment. Perhaps we will see Robinson’s application
to analog papers questioned along these lines in future cases, leading to a
warrant requirement for all searches of papers incident to arrest.
In any event, the anomaly Riley creates is a stark shift in the rules for
what are sometimes very similar materials. Imagine that police surreptitiously
observe a suspect buy an extra cell phone, confirm with the vendor that it was a
new account (therefore not downloading from the cloud any information
associated with an existing account), and arrest him 30 minutes later, after he
appears to use the phone in a criminal transaction. The fact that the police know
the phone contains almost no information does not appear to affect the brightline rule of Riley. They cannot search the phone without a warrant based on
probable cause the phone contains evidence of a crime. But if the police surveil a
suspect and wait for him to have his 300,000 word paper diary in his possession,
it appears that they can carefully read the whole thing incident to his lawful
arrest, without any reason to believe it contains evidence of a crime. The rule is
not tightly tailored to the amount of privacy the police violate or expect to
violate. It is instead tied to the form in which the private is stored, which is only
a proxy for the amount of private information at stake.
A rule permitting a warrantless, scope-limited search of the cell phone
would not eliminate the anomaly, but would narrow it considerably. The
compromise of a scope-limited search of digital containers would move that
category closer to the search of analog papers. Instead of all or nothing, it would
be all or some.
The scope-limited approach might even lead to the elimination of the
anomaly entirely. If we had a scope-limited rule, courts might see the virtue in
applying it, not merely to cell phones and other digital devices, but also to all
“papers,” digital or analog. Thus, the cell phone and the diary would be subject
only to a cursory search incident to arrest. As with the cell phone, after a valid
arrest, the police could page through a notebook quickly to identify and check
recent entries if police have reason to believe the entries contain evidence of the
crime of arrest, but would require a warrant for any more comprehensive search.
The Robinson rule allowing automatic search of containers would remain in place
for “effects” (briefcases, purses, backpacks, etc.).
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D. Dilution of the Exigent Circumstances Exception
I close with a brief prediction: The refusal to recognize a scope-limited
search will put pressure on lower courts to expand the exigent circumstances
exception. As in Fearon, the police will frequently arrest individuals for a crime
committed with reason to believe that co-felons remain at large; they will
frequently conduct a search incident to arrest of the arrestee and the effects in his
or her possession and fail to find instrumentalities or proceeds of the crime, e.g.,
weapons, drugs, or stolen goods. The police will then use these missing suspects
and evidence to claim exigency. The claims should fail because the mere existence
of an undiscovered co-felon or criminal proceeds does not provide probable
cause to believe that there is on the arrestee’s phone evidence of the identity or
location of co-felons, weapons, or evidence, much less probable cause that the cofelon is currently fleeing or concealing evidence. But the courts will see some
cases where hindsight showed the police officers to be right, and there will be
pressure to uphold the validity of the warrantless search on an exigency theory.
The long term effect will be to expand the category of exigency.
As an example, consider the decision below in Wurie, the companion case
to Riley. 114 Police arrested Wurie after observing him make an apparent drug sale
from a car. Immediately after the arrest, Wurie’s phone received repeated calls
from a source labeled on the external screen as “my house.” After a few minutes,
police opened the (flip) phone and determined the number associated with “my
house.” They determined that it was a land line and went to the associated
apartment. Through the first floor apartment window, police saw a woman they
said matched a photo that served as the cell phone’s wallpaper, so they
immediately entered the apartment to “freeze” it while waiting to secure a search
warrant. The Tenth Circuit panel found a fourth amendment violation and
reversed. 115 Judge Howard dissented and one ground he gave for upholding the
search was exigency, “the risk that others might have destroyed evidence after
Wurie did not answer his phone. . . . His failure to answer [repeated] phone calls

United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013). Cf. Pennsylvania v. Labron
518 U.S. 938 (1996) (confirming that exigent circumstances are not necessary to justify a
warrantless car search based on probable cause, despite the original importance of
mobility-based exigency to the automobile exception).
115 Id.
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36

could have alerted Wurie's confederates to his arrest, prompting them to destroy
further evidence of his crimes.” 116
The majority responded that this concern over evidence destruction is
“mere speculation” and that “it is also a possibility present in almost every
instance of a custodial arrest.” 117 Judge Howard replied: “On the contrary, the
justification is based on the specific facts of this case. The fact that ‘my house’
repeatedly called Wurie's cell phone provided an objective basis for enhanced
concern that evidence might be destroyed and thus gave the police a valid reason
to inspect the phone.” 118
The panel majority was correct; the argument for exigency involves not
one but two levels of speculation. 119 The first is that there are drugs in the
apartment of a person suspected of selling drugs, as if the bare fact of arresting a
suspected drug dealer in public would always justify a warrant to search the
arrestee’s home. To the contrary, a seller might avoid the risk of keeping drugs in
his home or he might just be out of inventory. The second level of speculation is
that the person dialing the suspect’s cell phone from the suspect’s home will (a)
interpret the failure to answer (for less than an hour) as evidence of the
individual’s arrest and (b) be in a position to take the initiative to move or
destroy drugs stored in the home (knowing, for example, where they are
located). These are nothing more than mere possibilities. Yet not only did the
police search the phone, with the additional fact that the woman in the cell phone
wallpaper was spotted inside the apartment, the police executed a warrantless
entry into a home (to secure it pending a search warrant). Admittedly, two
judges on the panel rejected the exigency argument, but one federal appellate
judge found it convincing. By blocking other paths, Riley’s holding will make the
exigency argument more alluring.
Time will tell whether my prediction is accurate. At the extreme, courts
might expand their recognition of exigency to the point where the same searches
a scope-limited search doctrine would authorize are permitted under a different
Id. at 17.
Id. at 11 & n.11.
118 Id. at 17.
119
To be clear, my argument in Part III-B for a scope-limited search is based in
part on the idea that speculation such as Judge Howard’s will sometimes prove true,
making the category of searches productive. But, as I explain, it would be better to
authorize the scope-limited search as a direct incident to all arrests than to get to the
same result by watering down the meaning of exigency.
116
117

37

name. That might make it appear unimportant that the Court rejected the idea of
a scope-limited search. The problem is that the broadening of exigent
circumstances will have effects beyond the search of cell phones incident to
arrest. The search-incident exigency cases can be cited as precedent for homeentry exigency cases or other searches ordinarily requiring a warrant. The same
exigency that justifies a peek inside the suspect’s cell phone can usually justify a
peek inside the suspect’s house. Whatever loosening occurs in the cell phone
context will not remain limited to that domain, an undesirable unintended
consequence and a final reason that it would have been better to address the
problem with the right tool, a scope-limited search.

Conclusion
Riley has been immediately recognized as an important case for the
proposition that fourth amendment rules and precedents of non-technological
settings may not apply to analogous technological settings. For that reason, it
deserves praise. Less obviously, however, the case is important in a second way,
for its rejection of a cursory, scope-limited search of (digital) papers incident to
arrest. Instead of requiring a warrant for any cell phone search incident to arrest,
the Court could have permitted police to conduct a brief field search of a cell
phone incident to arrest, without a warrant, where there is reason to believe that
the phone contains useful evidence of the crime of arrest and where the police
limit their search to the places where such evidence might realistically be found
(perhaps all as confirmed by contemporaneous police notes of the search). Some
fourth amendment rules distinguish between a full-fledged and cursory search,
but here the Court added to the precedent (notably Hicks) rejecting such a
distinction when the object of the search is personal property (other than an
automobile).
Riley is for this reason a notable case for the bedrock issue of how many
types of search exist in the fourth amendment. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear
that the Court made the right decision, given that many lower courts (and the
Canadian Supreme Court) did recognize a scope-limited search incident to
arrest, and Riley offers only the most superficial analysis of its decision to reject
that approach. The effects of this second aspect of Riley, I have argued, are more
negative than positive, but will ultimately depend on how seriously magistrates
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review warrant applications for cell phone searches and how much they relax the
requirements of exigency in cases where police forgo a warrant.
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